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AUTHOR Ichilov, Orit
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of the degree of family politicization on several citizenship orientations of adolescents. The research population consisted of 734 respondents, ages 14-18, who were students in both academic and vocation schools in the greater Tel-Aviv area. Degree of family politicization was assessed using three sub-scales: parents' own involvement; the extent to which parents and children discuss politics, and the degree to which parents encourage their children to take an active public role in school and in youth organizations. Citizenship orientations included the perception of the citizen role as active vs. passive, and as restricted to the political sphere vs. as a broader commitment to one's community and society. Also included were political efficacy, support of freedom of speech, and political involvement. A path model measuring the effects of social and personal background variables and of family politicization was tested. The major findings indicate that respondents' age and S.E.S. [socioeconomic status] were related to their perceived degree of family politicization. The older the respondents and the lower their S.E.S., the greater the tendency to report of lower family politicization. Concerning the effects of family politicization upon the perception of the citizen role, none of the path coefficients was statistically significant, and the percentage of explained variance was low. Concerning the other citizenship orientations, family politicization had significant effects. The higher the degree of family politicization, the greater the political efficacy and involvement of the respondents, and the lower their support of freedom of speech. (Author)

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FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND ADOLESCENTS' CITIZENSHIP ORIENTATIONS

ORIT ICHILOV

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the effect of the degree of family politicization on several citizenship orientations of adolescents. The research population consisted of 734 respondents ages 14-18, who were students in both academic and vocational schools in the greater Tel-Aviv area. Degree of family politicization was assessed using three sub-scales: parents' own involvement; the extent to which parents and children discuss politics, and the degree to which parents encourage their children to take an active public role in school and in youth organizations. Citizenship orientations included the perception of the citizen role as active Vs. passive, and as restricted to the political sphere Vs. as a broader commitment to one's community and society. Also included were political efficacy, support of freedom of speech, and political involvement. A path model measuring the effects of social and personal background variables and of family politicization was tested. The major findings indicate that respondents' age and S.E.S. were related to their perceived degree of family politicization. The older the respondents and the lower their S.E.S., the greater the tendency to report of lower family politicization. Concerning the effects of family politicization upon the perception of the citizen role, none of the path coefficients was statistically significant, and the percentage of explained variance was low. Concerning the other citizenship orientations, family politicization had significant effects. The higher the degree of family politicization, the greater the political efficacy and involvement of the respondents, and the lower their support of freedom of speech.

FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND ADOLESCENTS' CITIZENSHIP ORIENTATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Studies of the family as an agent of political socialization indicate that overall its impact upon the formation of children's citizenship orientations is quite limited. If that influence is measured by intergenerational continuity, the correlations between parents' and children's orientations are overall positive but weak. Measured by rebellion, the political sphere rarely serves as a target of intergenerational rebellion (Ichilov, 1984). This conclusion is surprising given the duration and intensity of children's exposure to familial influences. One possible explanation that has been offered is that familial characteristics relevant to the political socialization process were not yet properly identified and measured (Connell, 1972; Ichilov, 1984).

This study attempts to contribute to our understanding of political socialization in two principal ways. First, in contrast to studies which focused upon family characteristics such as S.E.S or the socialization techniques employed by the parents, which can be related to a wide range of outcomes, the present study focuses upon the degree of family politicization which, presumably is more directly related to the formation of citizenship orientations. Secondly, some studies examined primarily interfamilial characteristics and processes such as the authority structure of the family or the emotional relations between parents and children (Keniston, 1967; Bloch et.al., 1969; Chaffee et.al., 1973). Others have focused mainly upon characteristics related to the position of the family within the socio-cultural structure, such as S.E.S and ethnic origin, or upon social forces external to the family which shape distinct generational characteristics (Mannheim, 1952; Converse & Dupeux, 1962; Converse, 1964). In the present study the two sets of familial characteristics are integrated in a model in an attempt to examine their direct and indirect relationships to selected citizenship orientations of Israeli youth.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Socio-cultural familial characteristics and adolescents' citizenship orientations.

In western democracies a relationship was found between individuals' citizenship orientations and their socio-economic background, indicating that political sub-cultures at least partly overlap with status sub-cultures. Socio-economic status affects, for example, voting patterns (Himmelweit et.al., 1981). Also, people belonging to higher socio-economic groups more frequently possess a stronger sense of political efficacy, are better informed, and are more actively involved in public affairs than those belonging to the lower echelons of society. Liberal orientations were also more prevalent among members of higher S.E.S groups (Lane, 1959; Stouffer, 1955; Lipset, 1960; Easton, 1965; Milbrath, 1965). Many of these class differences among adults have been replicated among adolescents (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Langton, 1969; Jaros, 1973).

Ethnicity and race often overlap with S.E.S. In Israel there are two ethnic blocks which differ from each other in socio-economic status and cultural traditions: the Jews of western origin (i.e., Europe-America) who form the dominant group; and the Jews of eastern origin (i.e., Middle Eastern, Asian, and North African origin), who although now comprise over 50% of Israel's entire population, do not proportionally share in the national income, educational attainment, central political positions and prestigious occupations. These differences are also reflected in the political orientations and behaviors of members of the two blocks. Easterners tend to vote for the religious and right-wing parties, while westerners, especially those of higher S.E.S, more frequently opt for the left (Antonovsky, 1963 a,b; Arian, 1973; Zlozower, 1972). Also, adults of eastern origin were found to be less well informed about public affairs, expressed lower sense of political efficacy, participated less in politics and tended to have a lesser regard for the democratic civic culture (Fein, 1967; Nachmias, 1973; Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977). However, in spite of the great intergenerational continuity within Israeli society, Ichilov and Nave (1981) report that the civic orientations of eastern youth resembled those of their western counterparts. Both groups perceived

good citizenship primarily as a commitment to political institutions and processes, rather than as a broader commitment to the community and society. They also stressed passive orientations more than active participatory ones.

How do the socio-cultural characteristics of the family affect the formation of children's citizenship orientations in terms of both, intergenerational continuity and discontinuity? Our argument is that these familial traits can be decomposed into two major sets of variables with reference to the role of the family as an agent of political socialization. First, families have a controlling function which manifests itself in many ways. Families direct children toward "class appropriate" extra-familial frameworks such as schools, and youth organizations; and the parents might control the choice of friends by their children (Langton, 1967; Sebert et.al. 1974; Ichilov, 1984). In Israel, for example, participation in youth movements characterizes the middle classes, and the youngsters tend to join the same movements in which their parents had participated as adolescents (Eaton & Chen, 1970; Ichilov, 1977). Parents also serve as "gate keepers," controlling mass media use. The parents determine what newspapers, magazines and books are available at home, and the types and number of T.V. programs that children watch (Tolly, 1973; Atkin & Gantz, 1978; Chaffee & Becker, 1975; Roberts et.al., 1975; Renshon, 1977). The use of the various types of mass media to follow public affairs, rather than for entertainment purposes is more characteristic of the higher than of the lower S.E.S groups in society.

A second category includes interfamilial characteristics and processes which are related to actual interactions within the family. Here attention has focused upon nonpolitical human relations in general which, presumably, could serve as an important source for the understanding of political relations. Such interactions enable individuals to acquire competence in participatory behavior and in decision making processes, for example, which can later on be equally applied in political and in nonpolitical contexts. Almond and Verba (1963) report that participation, vaguely defined as subjects' memory of "consistently being able to express themselves in family decisions"

(pp. 287-8), was related to the acceptance of democratic attitudes and to civic competence. Others report that political activists grew up in families which allowed great freedom of experimentation, stressing the search for meaningful life more than materialism (Flacks, 1967). The tendency to politically rebel against the parents was associated with emotional distance between the child and parents, and was also more common when the parents were either too permissive or too stern (Middleton & Putney, 1963 a,b).

An important interfamilial trait which has been greatly neglected in political socialization studies is the degree of family politicization. Where it was considered, reference was made only to the parents' own involvement in politics and in public affairs. This implies, perhaps, that family politicization is assumed to exert influence upon children primarily through the example or the "role model" which the parents provide. Our extended definition of family politicization assumes that the parents can be influential in more ways. In the present study, in addition to parents' own involvement, family politicization included two more sub-scales. First, the extent to which parents and children discuss politics. Secondly, the degree to which parents encourage their children to take on an active public role in school and in youth organizations (For example: leaders in youth movements or members of the school council). These various aspects were examined subjectively, as reported by the youngsters themselves. We do not ask whether a youngster who grew up in highly politicized family is more likely to strongly support certain citizenship orientations; we ask the more modest question of whether youngsters who report that their parents are active, encouraging and responsive, also report of stronger support of such orientations. A similar approach has been adopted in other studies, notably by Almond & Verba, (1965).

Children who grow up within the same family might be differentially exposed to its influences. Concerning political socialization, children's age and sex seems to be of special relevance. Politics is sometimes considered as an area too remote and complex to be of interest to young children. Also, politics entails conflicts, while some parents tend to be protective and to

expose their young children mainly to the harmonious aspects of social life. Consequently, politics is considered a subject which parents rarely discuss with young children (Converse, 1964; Tolly, 1973). However, as children mature, they become increasingly sophisticated and knowledgeable about politics. Parents may, thus, have more political discussions with their adolescent children than with their younger ones. These discussions may be initiated by the parents or by the youngsters themselves. Older children may, thus, be more intensively exposed to familial influences than younger ones.

Politics is still considered a male's domain, and parents often encourage their sons more than their daughters to take interest in politics and in public affairs (Hyman, 1959; Greenstein, 1965; Easton & Dennis, 1969; Dowse & Hughes, 1971). This situation has somewhat changed in recent years as a result of a more egalitarian division of labor between men and women in the family and society. Consequently sex differentiated socialization might be diminishing, leading to greater similarity in parents' expectations of their children regardless of the child's sex. Also more "role models" are available today for girls of women who are actively involved in politics and in public affairs. Studies have shown that female "role models" are extremely important in shaping girls aspirations and orientations in the various social spheres (Aloquist & Angrist, 1971; Baruch, 1972).

The Hypothesized Causal Model

We assumed that the socio-cultural familial traits (i.e.: S.E.S, ethnic origin) and the respondents' personal traits (i.e.: age, sex) would be more strongly related to citizenship orientations via family politicization than directly. In order to get a more rounded picture of the impact of the various sources of influence upon youngsters' citizenship orientations, we constructed a model placing these variables in a logically coherent sequence. This model has been empirically examined using the statistical method of path analysis. This method can be used to determine whether variables which are causally prior on logical grounds, act directly or indirectly through the

influence of other variables (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973). In our case, are the respondents' S.E.S, ethnic origin, age and sex directly related to citizenship orientations, or is their impact mediated through family politicization. The hypothesized model is presented in Figure 1.

Insert Figure 1 about here

It is assumed that four extrinsic variables affect citizenship orientations. These variables might have a direct effect upon citizenship orientations. Their influence, however, could also be mediated through family politicization. In this case, while S.E.S and ethnic origin are assumed to affect the degree of reported parents' politicization, adolescents' sex and age are assumed to affect the degree of exposure to political interactions within the family. In other words, families of lower S.E.S and of eastern origin are expected to be less politicized than families representing higher socio-economic echelons and those of western origin. Also, boys as compared with girls, are expected to report of more frequent interactions with parents over political issues, and of greater parental encouragement to get involved in public affairs. The same should be expected of older children as compared with younger ones.

Citizenship orientations included the perception of the citizen role as active Vs. passive, and as restricted to the political sphere Vs. as a broader commitment to one's community and society. Also included were political efficacy, support of freedom of speech, and political involvement.

We expected the indirect impact of the four extrinsic variables, which operates through family politicization, to be greater than their direct impact upon citizenship orientations. More specifically, we expected adolescents who come from highly politicized families to project (with the effects of all other variables partialled out) more active and a broader image of the good citizen, to possess a stronger sense of political efficacy, and to express greater involvement and stronger support of freedom of speech than youngsters who come from less politicized families.

The Study

The research population. The study population consisted of a purposive sample of 734 high school students ages 14-18, from both academic and vocational schools in the greater Tel-Aviv area. The sample equally represented both sexes, and was heterogeneous, including the different ethnic and socio-economic groups of the Jewish population.

The research instrument and data collection. The respondents replied to a closed questionnaire which solicited information concerning citizenship orientations and such background factors as parents' education, occupation, country of origin, etc. A more detailed description of the research instrument is provided in the section on the research variables.

The research variables. The variables in the path model were constructed and measured as follows:

Sex (X1): 1=males, 2=females.

Age (X2): 1=14, 2=15, 3=16, 4=17, 5=18.

S.E.S (X3): Socioeconomic status is an index based on the sum of standardized scores of father's education and occupation. Father's education was measured by number of years of schooling and was coded 1 for higher education and 8 for partial elementary education. Father's occupation was coded by Hartman's Israeli occupational prestige scale (Hartman, 1979) and was divided into five categories (1=high, 5=low). Overall S.E.S was then divided into three categories: 1=high, 3=low.

Ethnic Origin (X4): Was determined by father's country of birth and coded: 1=western, 2=Israeli born, 3=eastern.

Family Politicization (X5, X6, X7, X8): Is an index based on the sum of scores of the following items:

1. My parents and I discuss politics and public affairs.
2. My parents encourage me to take interest in politics and public affairs.
3. My parents refrain from expressing political views in my presence.
4. Compared with parents of my friends, my parents discuss politics with me a great deal.
5. My parents encourage me to take on public roles in school.
6. My parents encourage me to take on public roles in the youth movement.
7. Compared to parents of my friends, my parents are greatly interested in politics.
8. Compared with parents of my friends, my parents are active in public affairs.

We sometimes referred to the overall degree of family politicization, and sometimes to the following sub-scales:

- a. Interaction over politics within the family, consisted of the sum of scores of items 1 through 4.
- b. Parents' encouragement, consisting of the sum of scores of items 5,6.
- c. Parents' own involvement, consisting of the sum of scores of items 7,8.

Perception of the "Good Citizen" (X9, X10, X11, X12): consisted of 36 items describing the "good citizen" which were classified by the respondents into 5 categories: 1=most important, 5=least important. The items included equally political and nonpolitical characteristics. The political items reflected the citizen's passive as well as active relationships to political officials, processes and institutions. The nonpolitical items included personal traits such as honesty and truthfulness, and characteristics reflecting the relationships of the citizen to particularistic frameworks such as the family and place of work.

In our analysis these items were grouped into two major categories, political (X9) and nonpolitical (X12) items. The political category was further divided into active (X10) Vs. passive

(X11) orientations. The data processing refers sometimes to the overall political dimension, and sometimes to its subcategories.

Freedom of Speech (13): Consisted of the sum of scores of the following items:

1. People should not be allowed to speak against democracy.
2. Citizens should not criticize the state and its institutions.
3. When the government considers an article to be offensive to the public, it has the right to close up the newspaper in which the article has been published.
4. It would have been for the best if extremist people and groups, which interfere with the normal conduct of public affairs, could be eliminated.

The scores ranged between 1=high support of freedom of speech, and 5=low support.

Political Efficacy (X14): Consisted of the sum of scores of the following items:

1. The government consists of a few powerful and influential people, who have no concern for the interests and opinions of the citizens.
2. Citizens possess many means for exerting influence and control of the government between elections.
3. I'm more knowledgeable about politics and public affairs than most of my friends.
4. Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like me cannot comprehend what really goes on.

The scores ranged between 1=high efficacy to 5=low.

Political Involvement (X15): Was an index based on the sum of scores of the following ten items:

1. I feel responsible for what is now happening in the state.
2. I'm interested in Israeli politics and public affairs.
3. I think a great deal about what is happening in the country.
4. I regularly discuss politics and public affairs with my friends.

5. I regularly follow the news in the newspapers.
 6. If I were requested to sign a petition dealing with civil liberties, I would have signed it.
 7. I'm prepared to demonstrate for something I believe in.
 8. I'm prepared to write a "letter to the editor" about injustice that I encountered.
 9. I'm prepared to dedicate a social meeting to discuss political issues.
 10. I'm willing to become active in an ideological movement.
- Political involvement was coded 1=high, 5=low.

Findings

We had expected adolescents' perception of family politicization to be related to their age, sex, S.E.S and ethnic origin. However, the data presented in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that only age and S.E.S had a significant effect upon family politicization. As expected,

Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here

respondents of higher S.E.S reported of higher overall family politicization, of greater parental involvement in politics, and of frequent discussion with parents of political issues. However, contrary to expectations, increase in age was inversely related to overall family politicization. Older adolescents, as compared with younger ones, described their parents as less involved and as less encouraging of them to get involved in public affairs.

We had also expected adolescents' citizenship orientations to be more strongly related to family politicization than to their age, sex, S.E.S, and ethnic origin. This expectation was supported by the data concerning political efficacy and political involvement only. Family

politicization had the largest effect upon these orientations, and of special importance was the sub-scale of parent/child interaction. Differences were found between boys and girls concerning these two orientations. Girls possessed a stronger sense of political efficacy, and reported of greater political involvement than boys. Political involvement also tended to increase with the rise in the respondents' age. The largest percentage of explained variance by all antecedent variables was that of political involvement (21.3%). These variables accounted for 10.2% of the variance of political efficacy.

Concerning freedom of speech, age had the largest effect, indicating that support increases with the increase in the respondents' age. Also, girls were less supportive of freedom of speech than boys, and respondents of higher S.E.S were more supportive than respondents representing the lower S.E.S groups. Family politicization shows an interesting relationship to support of freedom of speech. Contrary to our expectations, the more politicized the family, the weaker the support of freedom of speech. The antecedent variables accounted for 19.2% of the variance of freedom of speech.

The perception of the good citizen, contrary to expectations, was not related to any of the antecedent variables, and the percentage of explained variance of its various sub-scales was low. The only exception is the effect of ethnic origin upon the active dimension of good citizenship, indicating that respondents of western origin assigned to it greater importance than respondents of eastern origin.

Conclusion

The purpose of the present study was to examine the effects of extrafamilial traits (i.e.: S.E.S and ethnic origin), interfamilial characteristics (i.e: degree of family politicization and its sub-scales), and respondents' personal traits (i.e: sex and age) upon selected citizenship orientations. We assumed that the extrafamilial and the personal traits can be directly related to

citizenship orientations, or indirectly via family politicization. While respondents' age may signify growing sophistication and knowledge, it was argued that age and sex can also signify differential exposure to familial interactions. Older children and boys were, thus, expected to be more intensively exposed to familial influences than both girls and younger children. Respondents' S.E.S and ethnic origin can be directly related to citizenship orientations by virtue of placing individuals in political sub-cultures which, at least partly overlap with class sub-cultures. They can also be indirectly related to citizenship orientation, through their effect upon interfamilial interactions.

Overall, the degree of politicization of families in the present study was described by our adolescent respondents as medium (the scores ranged between 2.122 and 3.406). The data revealed that contrary to expectations, older respondents tended to describe their families as less politicized than their younger counterparts. They reported that their parents are less involved in politics, and less encouraging of them to take on active public roles in school and in the youth movements. This unexpected finding can perhaps be attributed to the growing ability of adolescents to criticize reality by applying some ideological standards, and to their growing sophistication, knowledge and independence (Adelson & O'neil, 1966; Adelson, 1971; Connell, 1971; Merelman, 1971). Older respondents' description of their families as less politicized may, thus, reflect criticism of their parents and a less idealized image of adults in general. The respondents' perception of diminishing parental encouragement can also be related to actual decrease in parental support for their children's involvement in various extra-curricular activities. Parents may be preoccupied with adolescents' success in the matriculation examinations, most of which take place in the 11th. and 12th. grades of the Israeli high school. Consequently, they may encourage their children to concentrate on their studies, and to give up, at least temporarily, other types of activity.

As expected, respondents of higher socioeconomic status reported that their parents are politically involved and discuss politics with them, more often than respondents of lower S.E.S. However, no differences in family politicization were found by ethnic origin. That ethnic origin

had no significant effect upon family politicization is related, perhaps, to the fact that the majority of Israel's population, whether of eastern or of western origin, came over from non-democratic countries. As a result, S.E.S rather than ethnic origin may have greater relevance for family politicization. Contrary to expectations, no differences were found between boys and girls concerning reported family politicization.

We had expected the indirect effect of age, sex, S.E.S and ethnic origin, i.e., the one mediated through family politicization, to be greater than their direct effect upon adolescents' citizenship orientations. This proved to be the case only concerning political efficacy and political involvement for which family politicization had the strongest effect. As expected high family politicization was related to stronger sense of political efficacy and to greater political involvement. However, contrary to expectations it was inversely related to the support of freedom of speech: the more politicized the family, the lower the support of freedom of speech. In Israel politics is very heavily ideologically infused. In other words, political struggles between groups are related to the very image of the state and its institutions, and not merely to the size of the slices allocated from the "national pie." The rifts between groups are related to such sensitive issues as separation of state and religion, treatment of minorities, and the future of the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip (Isaac, 1976). Consequently, people who are politicized most probably are not neutral, but rather take a stand over these issues. In Israel this trend seems to be related to lack of tolerance for other people's views, and to a lesser support of freedom of speech. Shamir and Sullivan (1982) have found that the overall levels of political tolerance in Israel, while not high, are similar to levels found in the U.S. in the 1980s. However, unlike the U.S., these levels of tolerance were similarly characteristic of Israelis regardless of their S.E.S., ethnic origin, and religiosity. The selection of the least-liked groups in Israel varied according to socio-cultural background characteristics, but not the levels of tolerance.

The data also reveals that S.E.S and ethnic origin were not significantly related to most of the orientations that were examined. The only two exceptions were concerning freedom of speech which

was more strongly supported by respondents of higher S.E.S groups, and active participation which was more prevalent among western respondents. Respondents' personal traits, i.e. age and sex, had greater relevance for citizenship orientations than the socio-cultural characteristics of the family. Increase in the respondents' age was related to an increase in their support of freedom of speech and of political involvement. Girls projected greater political involvement and a stronger sense of political efficacy than boys, but expressed lower support than boys for freedom of speech. Girls' weaker support of freedom of speech can be related to their stronger political involvement which, in Israel, is usually inversely related to tolerance for other people's views.

The results of the present study may have some broader implications for the study of the process of political socialization and of the role of the family in it. Students of political socialization, implicitly or explicitly, make some assertions which, our data suggests, should be reconsidered. First, while the fact that political orientations and behaviors are not derived from simply one source has been recognized, students of political socialization often consider the influence of a particular socialization agent to uniformly affect all types of citizenship orientations. Almond and Verba (1963), for example, maintain that participation in decisions in non-political settings such as the family, school and place of work, reinforces individuals' overall civic competence and their support of democratic values. Secondly, civic competences such as "participation" and "involvement" were considered to be free of content. Once mastered, these competences can be generalized and applied in a variety of contexts to a wide range of contents.

Our data indicate that familial characteristics differentially affect the orientations that were examined in terms of both strength and direction of the relationships. While interaction with parents was the most important family trait, strengthening political efficacy and involvement, parents' own involvement has weakened respondents' support for freedom of speech. The perception of the "good citizen" was not related to family politicization and to the other antecedent variables. These differences can be related to the content and nature of the orientations themselves. For example, orientations may vary in their complexity, concreteness, the frequency of

their occurrence in the family and in other social settings, in what emotions they arouse, and in what behavioral demands they make upon individuals. The fact that the perception of the "good citizen" in the present study was not related to any of the antecedent variables can perhaps be attributed to the complex meaning of good citizenship in Israel, a society in which the political culture and the corresponding citizenship orientations have not yet fully emerged and crystallized.

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
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Figure 1: HYPOTHESIZED PATHS IN A CAUSAL MODEL EXPLAINING CITIZENSHIP ORIENTATIONS



SOCIAL/PERSONAL VARIABLES

X1 = SEX
X2 = AGE
X3 = S.E.S.
X4 = ETHNIC ORIGIN

FAMILY POLITICIZATION

X5 = OVERALL
X6 = PARENTS' ENCOURAGEMENT
X7 = PARENTS' INVOLVEMENT
X8 = PARENT/CHILD INTERACTION

CITIZENSHIP ORIENTATIONS

GOOD CITIZENSHIP
X9 = POLITICAL DIMENSION (OVERALL)
X10 = ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
X11 = PASSIVE PARTICIPATION
X12 = NON-POLITICAL DIMENSION

OTHER ORIENTATIONS
X13 = FREEDOM OF SPEECH
X14 = POLITICAL EFFICACY
X15 = INVOLVEMENT

TABLE 1: INTERCORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES (N=724)

	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11	X12	X13	X14	X15
1 SEX: 1=Male, 2=Female															
2 AGE: 1=14, 5=18	.106*														
3 S.E.S.: 1=High, 3=Low	.116*	-.005													
4 ETHNIC ORIGIN: 1=Western 3=Eastern	.325	-.079*	.182*												
5 FAMILY POLITICIZATION (OVERALL)	-.001	.171*	.117*	.067											
6 ENCOURAGEMENT	-.010	.235*	.067	-.028	.667*										
7 INVOLVEMENT	-.031	.153*	.122*	.050	.676*	.310*									
8 INTERACTION	.025	.044	.177*	.103*	.814*	.234*	.337*								
9 POLITICAL DIMENSION (OVERALL)	.012	.026	.013	-.044	.028	.005	.038	.027							
10 ACTIVE PARTICIPATION	-.079*	-.089*	-.010	.032	-.064	-.019	-.066	-.057	-.341*						
11 PASSIVE PARTICIPATION	-.097*	.052	.007	-.044	.089*	.050	.103*	.066	.735*	-.323*					
12 NON-POLITICAL DIMENSION	-.032	.032	.008	-.048	-.024	-.027	-.015	-.011	.818*	-.304*	.252*				
13 FREEDOM OF SPEECH	.092*	-.243*	.140*	.093*	.183*	-.212*	-.202*	.052	.076	-.049	.034	.065			
14 POLITICAL EFFICACY	-.146*	-.080*	.050	.028	.221*	.044	.163*	.224*	-.031	-.073	-.028	-.011	-.009		
15 POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT	-.128	-.054	.062	.043	.408*	.200*	.182*	.440*	.044	-.050	.056	.020	-.011	.362*	
$\bar{X}$	1.503	2.975	2.096	2.322	2.764	2.905	3.018	2.573	2.664	3.203	3.086	2.325	2.420	2.975	2.404
S.D.	.500	1.116	.825	.888	.642	1.097	.904	.740	.398	.368	.511	.463	.799	.763	.583

 $p \leq .05$

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TABLE 2: DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS (X9-X15): PATH COEFFICIENTS

DEPENDENT VARIABLES	ANTECEDENT VARIABLES			ETHNIC ORIGIN	FAMILY POLITICIZATION	ENCOURAGE- MENT	PARENTS' INVOLVEMENT	INTERACTION	R ² **
	SEX	AGE	S.E.S.						
FAMILY POLITICIZATION (OVERALL)	-.045	.207*	.150*	.049					.064
PARENTS' ENCOURAGEMENT	-.025	.237*	.034	-.011					.058
PARENTS' INVOLVEMENT	-.074	.171*	.127*	.034					.045
PARENT/CHILD INTER- ACTION	-.015	-.080	.193*	.076					.051
POLITICAL DIMENSION (OVERALL)	-.001	.010	-.001	-.094	.021	-.021 (.009)	.031 (.009)	.032 (.100)	.009
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION	.057	-.062	.094	.142*	-.069	-.014 (.040)	-.069 (.045)	-.082 (.046)	.044
PASSIVE PARTICIPATION	-.060	.067	-.022	-.053	.090	.050 (.016)	.085 (.021)	.070 (.019)	.022
NON-POLITICAL DIMENSION	-.084	-.000	.016	-.034	-.057	-.070 (.017)	-.014 (.012)	-.038 (.014)	.015
FREEDOM OF SPEECH	.156*	-.343*	.130*	.067	-.136*	-.106* (.153)	-.160* (.200)	-.056 (.178)	.192
POLITICAL EFFICACY	-.195*	-.075	.039	-.022	.245*	.058 (.051)	.167* (.074)	.260* (.115)	.102
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT	-.146*	-.109*	.038	.034	.430*	.198* (.032)	.175* (.074)	.469* (.251)	.213

* Coefficient is more than twice its standard error ($p \leq .05$)

** The R² reported is with overall family politicization. The R² with each of the subscales appears in brackets.